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Freedom of Thought, Offensive Fantasies and
the Fundamental Human Right to Hold Deviant Ideas:
Why the Seventh Circuit Got it Wrong in
Doe v. City of Lafayette, Indiana
CLAY CALVERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
A precarious balance and considerable tension exists between two
competing legal interests – the essential, First Amendment-grounded1 human right to freedom of thought,2 on the one hand, and the desire to prevent harm and injury that might occur if thought is converted to action, on
the other. To understand this tension, it is useful to start by considering
three different and disturbing factual scenarios.
Scenario 1: A man recently completed a prison term for the crime of
assault with a deadly weapon.3 He now stands outside of Madison Square
Garden in New York City. It is September 2, 2004. The man is an anarchist with radical ideas. More than anything else, however, he hates President George W. Bush, who will speak that night at Madison Square Garden.4 Like many protestors outside of the Republican National Convention,5 he chants the usual down-with-Bush slogans. However, this man
* Associate Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania Center for
the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State University. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford
University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D.,
1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks
Cornelius Cornelssen, Rachel Frankel and Lesley O’Connor of The Pennsylvania State University for
their assistance that contributed to this article.
1. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. N.Y., 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (writing that “the right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all”) (emphasis added).
3. See e.g. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 245 (West 2005) (articulating the crime of assault with a deadly
weapon).
4. See generally Ken Herman, Bush Promises a Safer America; Stay the Course in War on Terror,
President Urges, Atlanta J. & Const. 1A (Sept. 3, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, ATLJNL
file) (describing President George W. Bush’s party nomination acceptance speech at the Republican
National Convention on September 2, 2004 at Madison Square Garden).
5. See generally David Zucchino, The Race To The White House; Protests Meet a Nimble NYPD;
Police Tracked Rallies During the Republican National Convention with the Web and Bike, L.A. Times
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also thinks about what it would be like to kill the President. He fantasizes
about shooting President Bush as he watches the presidential motorcade
arrive and he sees the President step out of his car to wave to the crowd.
But the man does not act on his fantasies. After President Bush enters
Madison Square Garden, the man peacefully leaves the scene and heads
home.
Scenario 2: A fourteen-year-old boy is often taunted by classmates at
school because he is perceived to be a “freak.” The boy loves to play
video games, both at home and at an arcade a block away from his school.
His favorite games depict graphic images of violence, much like those
played by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the killers at Columbine High
School.6 As he plays the games, he fantasizes about walking down the
block, entering his school and killing three of his classmates who bully him
the most. He admires Michael Carneal, a student near Paducah, Kentucky
who came into school one day in 1997 and opened fire on some classmates, killing three students.7 Although the boy has access to a gun at
home, he never brings it to school or converts his thoughts to action. He
always goes home from the video arcade peacefully.
Scenario 3: A man has “a long history of arrests and convictions for
sexually related crimes.”8 Although now free from prison and nearly a
decade removed from his last conviction, “he still has fantasies about children.”9 One day, he drives to a park and watches “five youths in their early
teens playing on a baseball diamond.”10 While watching the children, he
thinks about having sexual contact with them.11 However, “without having
any contact with them,”12 he leaves the park peacefully, telling himself,
“I’ve got to get out of here before I do something.”13 The man later states
A21 (Sept. 4, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, LAT file) (describing protests outside of the
Republican National Convention).
6. See generally Lynn Bartels & Ann Imse, Friendly Faces Hid Kid Killers: Social, Normal Teens
Eventually Harbored Dark, Sinister Attitudes, Rocky Mt. News (Denver, Colo.) 10A (Apr. 22, 1999)
(available at LEXIS, News library, RMTNEW file) (describing how Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold
“linked their home computers and for hours played violent video games”); Mitchell Zuckoff & Ellen
O'Brien, Town, Nation Staggered by School Killings, Boston Globe (Boston, Mass.) A1 (Apr. 22, 1999)
(describing the tragedy at Columbine High School as “one of the deadliest school attacks in US history” and noting that “[t]he two suspects, Eric D. Harris, 18, and Dylan Bennet Klebold, 17, misfits
who dabbled in Nazi worship and other antisocial behavior, allegedly vented their shared, murderous
anger in a midday rampage . . . that was at once viciously methodical and horribly random”).
7. See generally Monte Reel, Kentucky Teen-Ager Kills 3 At School; 5 Others in Prayer Group Are
Shot in West Paducah Attack; Police Arrest 14-Year-Old Boy, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (St. Louis, Mo.)
A1 (Dec. 2, 1997) (available at LEXIS, News library, SLPD file).
8. Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d 757, 758 (7th Cir. 2004).
9. Id. at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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in a sworn affidavit, “I certainly had sexual thoughts. However, I was not
planning to act on my thoughts. I recognized that these were just unhealthy thoughts and I realized I needed to leave the park, which is what I
did.”14
The first two of these three scenarios are fictitious, yet probably not
too much of a stretch today, given both the anger and deep-seated feelings
toward President Bush outside of the Republican National Convention and
the school shootings across the United States that so often are blamed on
media products like video games.15 The third scenario, involving the sexual predator that somewhat sounds as if it were ripped from the lead lines
of an aging Jethro Tull song,16 is anything but fictitious. In fact, it gave
rise to an important federal lawsuit, Doe v. City of Lafayette, Indiana,
which has worked its way through the federal court system, from the district court level17 to a three-judge appellate court18 and, finally, in July
2004, to an en banc, 8-3 divided decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.19
City of Lafayette is a unique case on the important human right of freedom to think. As Kenneth J. Falk, the attorney for defendant John Doe and
the Legal Director of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union,20 told the Washington Times, “I am unaware of any other case in the country like this. This
focuses on your thoughts. Usually we don’t know what people think
unless thought is tied to action. It’s really unique to be banned [from
parks] based on your thoughts.”21
While the issue in City of Lafayette of “whether the First Amendment
protects a citizen who goes to a venue and thinks about committing a
crime”22 has not been addressed by most courts in the United States, its
relevance extends far beyond the narrow confines of its facts. Indeed, it
would cover the first two hypotheticals set forth above, as well as any other
14. Id.
15. Cf. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Irony of News Coverage: How the Media Harm
Their Own First Amendment Rights, 24 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 215, 218 (2002) (describing
how “a sporadic number of school shootings, such as the one in Santee, California in March 2001, have
kept media attention and, in turn, public and legislative attention focused on the allegedly harmful
effects of media products on youths”).
16. See Jethro Tull, Aqualung, in Aqualung (Reprise 1971) (L.P.) (describing an old man “[s]itting
on a park bench eyeing little girls with bad intent . . . watching as the frilly panties run”).
17. 160 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ind. 2001), rev’d, 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003), aff’d on reh’g, 377
F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004).
18. 334 F.3d 606; vacated and reh’g granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16563 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2003).
19. 377 F.3d at 757 (en banc).
20. See Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Who We Are, http://www.iclu.org/who_we_are (accessed
Apr. 23, 2005).
21. Frank J. Murray, Lifting of Ban on Sex Predator in Parks to be Appealed, Wash. Times (July 3,
2003) (available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20030702-113116-8223r.htm).
22. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 778 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting).
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scenario in which a person harbors a thought to violate a criminal statute.
This issue extends to the driver who, when he is pulled over by a police
officer for allegedly speeding, thinks to himself as the officer walks up to
his car, “I’d love to kill that cop. Why isn’t he handling a real crime?”23 It
also applies to the husband who holds an internal monologue and fantasizes about avenging the brutal rape of his wife while he watches the rapist
in court being sentenced to only seven years in prison. The implications of
the issue in City of Lafayette are immense.
As a general principle, “[p]eople don’t get arrested for what they write
or what they think. They get arrested for what they do.”24 The holding in
City of Lafayette, when taken to its logical–perhaps, from the dissent’s
perspective, illogical–conclusion, suggests that this maxim may no longer
hold true. While it may have been clear in the past that one could think
about supporting terrorist groups like al-Qaida and their criminal activities
without running afoul of the law, this may no longer be the case.25 The
notion of an Orwellian thought-crime26 may indeed cross the minds of
some readers of the 2004 opinion in City of Lafayette.
This article examines and critiques the majority opinion of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Lafayette.27 The majority held that the
23. To further show the problem illustrated by this example, one must understand and remember
that Tupac Shakur’s songs called “Soulja’s Story” and “Crooked Ass Nigga,” both of which express
criminal sentiments about killing police officers, are fully protected by the First Amendment as free
speech. It would be ironic and nonsensical, then, if speech about killing the police were protected by
the First Amendment but thoughts about killing the police were not so sheltered. See Davidson v. Time
Warner, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559 at **5, 71-72 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997) (writing that
“although the Court cannot recommend 2Pacalypse Now to anyone, it will not strip Shakur’s free
speech rights,” and adding that “the First Amendment became part of the Constitution because the
Crown sought to suppress the Framers' own rebellious, sometimes violent views”); Tupac Shakur,
Soulja's Story, in 2Pacalyse Now (Interscope Records 1991) (CD) (“Cops on my tail, so I bail till I
dodge ‘em. They finally pull me over and I laugh. Remember Rodney King, and I blast on his punk
ass.”).
24. Sean Kelly, Arrest Not Tied to Article, Denver Post B-02 (June 2, 2004) (available at LEXIS,
News library, DPOST file) (quoting Bob Grant, a district attorney for the Colorado counties of Broomfield and Adams).
25. In sentencing Mukhtar al-Bakri to ten years in federal prison in December 2003 for aiding alQaida by training with the terrorist organization in Afghanistan, U.S. District Judge William M.
Skretny stated: “You are not being punished for what you think, or because of the possibility that you
may be dangerous. You are being punished because you knowingly and willfully engaged in conduct
that is contrary to the laws of the United States.” Dan Herbeck, 10 Years for First of Six, Buffalo News
(Buffalo, N.Y.) A1 (Dec. 4, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library, BUFNEW file). As Judge
Skretny’s comments suggest, there traditionally has been a marked difference between thoughts and
conduct in the law.
26. See generally Rene Sanchez, Librarians Make Some Noise Over Patriot Act; Concerns About
Privacy Prompt Some to Warn Patrons, Destroy Records of Book and Computer, Wash. Post A20
(Apr. 10, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library, WPOST file) (describing how author George Orwell’s now half-century old book, 1984, “depicts a world in which an all-powerful government known
as ‘Big Brother’ meddles in citizens' private lives and punishes them even for thought crimes”).
27. 377 F.3d 757.
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city’s ban of John Doe, a convicted sex offender, from its parks because he
once fantasized about molesting children while watching them play in the
park does not violate the First Amendment right to freedom of thought.28
The July 2004 en banc opinion reversed the result of an earlier vacated
decision by a three-judge panel of the same court just thirteen months before.29 The panel held that the park ban violated the unenumerated constitutional right of freedom of thought.30 The two judges who voted in favor
of John Doe the first time the appellate court heard the case, Judge Ann
Claire Williams31 and Judge Diane Pamela Wood,32 suddenly found themselves in a three-judge minority, along with Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner,33 in July 2004. They faced an eight-judge majority that included the
prominent and powerful Richard Posner.34 However, as this article demonstrates, there is much more to this case that is interesting and unusual
than the counterintuitive nature of the gender breakdown of the jurists.
The three female jurists were the only appellate court judges to take the
side of a convicted male sex offender, while all eight male judges in the en
banc proceeding ruled against Doe.35
28. See id. at 767 (“The First Amendment does not prohibit the City from taking the action it did to
protect its children. It does not require the City to act in an ostrichlike fashion and expose the children
of the City to the risk that, on a future date, a child will wander further from the group, present a better
opportunity and experience tragic consequences.”).
29. Doe, 334 F.3d 606.
30. Id. at 606.
31. Judge Williams, who was born in 1949 in Detroit, Michigan, has served on the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals since 1999 after being nominated by President Bill Clinton. See Federal Judicial
Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=2591 (accessed
Apr. 23, 2005).
32. Judge Wood, who was born in 1950 in Plainfield, New Jersey, has served on the Seventh Circuit
since 1995 after she was nominated by President Bill Clinton. She once was a clerk for former United
States Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United
States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/uGetInfo?jid=2636 (accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
33. Judge Rovner, who was born in 1938 in Riga, Latvia, has served on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals since 1992 after she was nominated by President George H. W. Bush. See Federal Judicial
Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/uGetInfo?jid=2066 (accessed
Apr. 23, 2005).
34. For purposes of full disclosure and to demonstrate objectivity, the author of this article has
lauded the work of Judge Posner on another First Amendment case involving a very different issue, but
this time the author rejects the reasoning of the majority opinion in City of Lafayette in which Judge
Posner joined. See Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games, and A Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the
Defense of Kids’ Culture and the First Amendment, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2002) (praising Judge
Posner’s opinion protecting the free speech rights of minors to play video games depicting violent
images in Am. Amus. Mach. Assn. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994
(2001)).
35. The eight-judge, all-male majority was comprised of Chief Judge Joel Martin Flaum and Circuit
Judges Richard Allen Posner, John Louis Coffey, Frank Hoover Easterbrook, Kenneth Francis Ripple,
Daniel Anthony Manion, Michael Stephen Kanne and Terence Thomas Evans. See City of Lafayette,
377 F.3d at 757-58 (listing the judges taking part in the decision and identifying those who dissented
from the rest); see Federal Judicial Center, Courts of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet
/tGetCourt?cid=23&order=a (accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
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This decision has also become somewhat of a political litmus test for
politicians in Indiana. As the Associated Press reported shortly after the
Seventh Circuit handed down its decision, “[t]wo candidates who want to
represent Lafayette in the Indiana House praised a federal court ruling barring a convicted child molester from city parks but said a statewide version
of the ban is needed.”36 To put that into context, a decision from the judiciary rejecting a constitutional right to freedom of thought now has resulted in calls for the legislative branch to essentially codify that ruling.
Joe Micon, the Democratic candidate, explicitly stated his willingness to
change the constitution when he professed, “I would be supportive of legislation.”37
What candidate, of course, would not want to pander to parents and
support such legislation? It is easy to run for office and to support legislation when it is strategically and narrowly framed,38 such as the concise and
visceral frame of “protect children from a pedophile” rather than the more
complex and less emotionally appealing frame of “protect a constitutional
right from legislative usurpation.”39 In justifying his mission to ban John
Doe from Lafayette’s parks, David Heath, mayor of Lafayette, Indiana,
stated “parks are for children and parks are for families. Families should
be able to send their children to our parks, knowing that they are not . . .
being window shopped by a sexual predator.”40
Ironically, Heath’s statement reveals the defect in his city’s decision to
ban John Doe from its parks. Window shopping means just that – looking
in and peering from the outside. There is a major difference between looking and conduct. Doe merely watched; he did not engage in any conduct.
Part II of this article provides background on the right to freedom of
thought, including a discussion of recent United States Supreme Court
analysis on this right. Part III then describes, analyzes, and critiques the
Seventh Circuit’s 2004 en banc opinion holding that the City of Lafayette
36. Associated Press, House Candidates Say Molester Ban Should Be Taken Statewide, Associated
Press Newswires (July 31, 2004) (available at WL, APWIRESPLUS database).
37. Id.
38. Framing is used here to refer to the rhetorical strategies, including such things as choice of
words and what facts to include and exclude, that are used in describing an event and that make salient
some issues surrounding the event while suppressing others, which, in turn, impacts how we think
about, understand and process the event in question. See generally Joseph N. Cappella & Kathleen
Hall Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good 38-48 (Oxford U. Press 1997)
(discussing the concept of framing within the field of journalism).
39. The framing of the issue by politicians as one about protecting children rather than one about
protecting a constitutional right became clear in July 2003 when David Heath, the mayor of Lafayette,
Indiana, told a national television audience on The O’Reilly Factor that “what we were trying to do is
very simple, and that’s protect children.” The O’Reilly Factor (Fox Broad. Co. July 2, 2003) (TV
broadcast).
40. Id.
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did not violate John Doe’s right to freedom of thought. Importantly, Part
III contends there are at least four separate reasons, each grounded in First
Amendment jurisprudence tied to freedom of expression, why the majority
erred in its conclusion. These reasons go far beyond those articulated in
the dissenting opinion in City of Lafayette and thus suggest new and additional rationales for reversal. Next, Part IV demonstrates the dangerousness of the precedent set by the majority’s reasoning as it might apply to
other scenarios, including the first two hypothetical fact patterns laid out at
the beginning of this article. Finally, the article concludes in Part V that
the United States Supreme Court should accept certiorari in this case and
reverse the Seventh Circuit’s decision.
II. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT: OF PRECEDENT AND IMPORTANCE
More than a decade ago, First Amendment scholar Rodney A. Smolla
described what he called “the inviolable primacy of freedom of thought.”41
Smolla, now Dean of the University of Richmond’s T.C. Williams School
of Law, posed the following question:
[W]ho would defend the prerogative of the state to censor thought?
Only by accepting that man is a creature of the state and that even
the intimate internal processes of mind that distinguish human existence are enjoyed at the state’s sufferance could such a monstrous and awesome intrusion be justified. To accept the proposition would be to accept the extinction of thousands of years of
moral evolution, in which the world has come slowly and painfully
to recognize that men possess certain entitlements to dignity and
autonomy by sheer virtue of their humanity.42
Freedom of thought, in other words, is an important moral principle,
not simply a legal one, that is linked to autonomy and individualism.43
And although a federal court recently observed that “the constitutional
basis for the protection of freedom of thought has never been fully clarified,” it is a concept that “undeniably finds its root in the First Amendment, and is undeniably protected,” prized and privileged by the United

41. Rodney A. Smolla, Freedom in an Open Society 11 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992).
42. Id.
43. See Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American
Life 142 (U. of Cal. Press 1985) (writing that “[w]e believe in the dignity, indeed the sacredness, of the
individual. Anything that would violate our right to think for ourselves, judge for ourselves, make our
own decisions, live our lives as we see fit, is not only morally wrong, it is sacrilegious”) (emphasis
added).
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States Supreme Court as integral to a democratic society.44 As the late
Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote, “without freedom of thought there
can be no free society.”45
Since Justice Frankfurter’s statement more than half a century ago,
freedom of thought has received renewed and reinvigorated interest from
the nation’s high court, particularly in the past three years. For instance, in
declaring unconstitutional a Texas anti-sodomy statute, Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote in 2003 for the majority of the Court that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”46 For Justice Kennedy, the concept of
freedom of thought was closely linked to one of the “more transcendent
dimensions” of human liberty and privacy.47
Just one year prior, in striking down on First Amendment grounds of
overbreadth48 a federal law criminalizing virtual images that appeared to be
of minors engaged in sexual conduct,49 Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court, stating:
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and
speech must be protected from the government because speech is
the beginning of thought.50
Importantly, Kennedy’s words came in the context of a case that, like City
of Lafayette, focused on the dangers of sexual predators that prey on children. In particular, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the federal government argued that the Child Pornography Prevention Act was justified,
in part, because “virtual child pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct.”51
In rejecting this argument, Kennedy wrote that “[t]he mere tendency of
speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning
44. Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 717 (6th Cir. 2001).
45. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
46. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 912 (2d ed., Aspen Law &
Bus. 2002) (“A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech than the
Constitution allows to be regulated and a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can
argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied to others.”).
49. The law at issue was the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260
(2000), which made it a crime to possess and distribute images that merely appeared to be of minors
engaging in sexual conduct even though no actual children were used in the production or creation of
the images.
50. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (emphasis added).
51. Id.
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it.”52 The same thing, of course, might be said for thoughts – that the mere
tendency of one’s thoughts to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
reason for banning them. Kennedy buttressed this position by quoting
from the Court’s opinion on the private possession of obscene material53 in
Stanley v. Georgia.54 Justice Kennedy noted that Stanley stood for the
proposition that government authorities “cannot constitutionally premise
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”55
Significantly, Kennedy observed that “the Court’s First Amendment
cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between ideas and
conduct.”56 It is this latter dichotomy that is so pivotal in the City of Lafayette case, given John Doe’s failure to take any action on his thoughts
beyond simply sitting in a park and watching children play. Kennedy
wrote that, with regard to the Child Pornography Prevention Act, “there is
here no attempt, incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy.”57 Likewise, John
Doe made no attempt to molest children playing in a park; he merely
thought about it, controlled his thoughts and impulses, and left.
Kennedy and the majority thus were able to declare the Child Pornography Prevention Act unconstitutional despite the twin recognitions that
pedophiles “flirt with . . . impulses” to molest children and that “sexual
abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral
instincts of a decent people.”58 Parsed differently, Kennedy and the majority were able to distinguish their own beliefs and feelings about the repulsive subject matter at issue from their legal analysis. However, as this article argues in Part III, the majority of the Seventh Circuit in City of Lafayette may have been unable to separate its disgust and revulsion with John
Doe’s prior actions and his present thoughts from its legal analysis of the
case. While one can surely sympathize with the majority for not providing
John Doe with what might be considered “the right to think the unthinkable,”59 and while one can, reasonably see the need to sacrifice individual
autonomy for societal safety, the majority’s opinion nonetheless is flawed.
Given the fact that John Doe’s fantasies involved the molestation of
children, it is important to note that at least one scholar believes that, in the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 247 (citing Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). Miller set forth the Supreme Court’s
current test for obscenity.
54. Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
55. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566).
56. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 244-45.
59. This phrase is borrowed from a very different context where the right to think is cherished
perhaps more than any other – higher education. See Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, 4 Human Rights 357, 357 (Summer 1975).
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United States, child pornography–a type of content often linked in the
minds of many to the molestation of minors by pedophiles60–already “has
become a thought crime.”61 Amy Adler, an associate professor of law at
New York University, wrote in a recent law review article:
[O]nce our interpretation depends on the pedophile’s imagined response to the picture, we have begun to police thoughts and fantasy, not actions. The harm of the pictures no longer turns on what
happened to the child. It now occurs in the possibility of seeing a
picture in a certain way, in how someone might perceive the child.
The determination of whether a picture is child pornography has
grown increasingly bound up in our projections of whether these
pictures will permit pedophiles to fantasize about them. Thus,
child pornography law has begun to police speech based on how
people may respond to it. This is in direct contravention of traditional First Amendment tenets.62
Of particular concern here for Professor Adler is the test under federal
law for determining whether certain images of minors depict a “lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.”63 Such an exhibition involving a
minor is deemed to constitute sexually explicit conduct forbidden by the
Child Pornography Prevention Act.64 In ferreting out whether such an exhibition exists, at least one federal appellate court has held that the key is
the “appeal to the lascivious interest of an audience of pedophiles.”65 Another federal appellate court has said that whether an image is lascivious is
determined, in part, by whether an image is “presented by the photographer
as to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of a voyeur.”66 Under such an
approach which focuses on a pedophile-viewer’s reaction, “a deviant’s
subjective response could turn innocuous images into pornography.”67 For
Adler, such a definition of child pornography–one that centers on the nexus
60. See e.g. R. Barri Flowers, The Sex Trade Industry’s Worldwide Exploitation of Children, 575
Annals of the Am. Acad. of Political & Soc. Sci. 147, 152 (May 2001) (writing that “[t]he consumers
of child pornography are predominantly male child molesters, pedophiles, and others with an abnormal
sexual interest in children”); Tim Tate, The Child Pornography Industry: International Trade in Child
Sexual Abuse in Pornography: Women, Violence & Civil Liberties 203, 211-13 (Catherine Itzen ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1992) (describing “the new breed of child pornographers: abusers who produced their
own material” and observing “the fundamental relationship between paedophilia [sic] and child pornography”).
61. Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 995 (2001).
62. Id.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (defining “sexually explicit conduct” to include “lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of any person”); Adler, supra n. 61, at 946-47.
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260.
65. U.S. v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994).
66. U.S. v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987).
67. U.S. v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999).
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between images and thoughts–is tantamount to a thought crime because it
pivots on the fact that “we do not like the way people think about certain
pictures of children.”68 She adds that “[t]he law demands that we examine
pictures to determine how a pedophile would see them; we then criminalize these pictures, or not, depending on that viewpoint.”69
The Supreme Court’s decision in Free Speech Coalition, handed down
just one year after the publication of Professor Adler’s article, does little to
mitigate her concerns. Free Speech Coalition focused solely on virtual
images of child pornography in the context of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996. The opinion did not address or disturb in any way
how courts interpret the meaning of the phrase “lascivious exhibition”
which is based on how a pedophile thinks about an image or photograph.
It is worth noting here that John Doe, the convicted pedophile at the
center of the City of Lafayette case, also was thinking about an image, albeit a real-life image of children playing, rather than one captured by a
camera. He simultaneously converted this image into a perverted fantasy,
which got him in trouble with officials in Lafayette, Indiana. Adler’s concern that child pornography is a thought crime thus might provide the legal
bridge that allowed the majority in City of Lafayette to connect thoughts
and punishment.
Seventy-five years before Free Speech Coalition, Justice Louis
Brandeis wrote in 1927 that those who won our independence in the United
States “believed that the freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth.”70 Of course, John Doe clearly was not seeking to discover or spread
some indispensable political truth while he was sitting and thinking in a
City of Lafayette park. In other words, his thoughts were not the type of
requisite precursors to valuable speech that Justice Brandeis envisioned
protecting. Indeed, Doe’s thoughts were prurient and deviant. Yet, as this
article argues in Part III, the First Amendment protection of speech today
shelters many forms of thoroughly low-brow expressive content, not simply uplifting political expression. The First Amendment, in turn, should
protect decidedly non-intellectual and offensive thoughts, provided they do
not manifest themselves in either criminal conduct (in which case the conduct, not the thoughts, is illegal) or in one of those limited categories of
expression that falls outside the scope of constitutional protection, such as
true threat of violence and obscenity.71
68. Adler, supra n. 61, at 995 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
71. The categories of unprotected speech include child pornography involving real children, N.Y. v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64, (1982); imminent incitement to violence and unlawful conduct, Bran-
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Taken collectively, all of the rather grandiose statements quoted above,
both old and new, suggest that freedom of thought both deserves and receives absolute protection as an unenumerated right under the First
Amendment. But in July 2004, a fractured United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit issued an en banc opinion that makes it clear that
there are limits on freedom of thought.
III. THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE AND THE NEED TO PROTECT IT
When a person transforms his deviant sexual thoughts about children
into deviant writings about them, he moves from the realm of thought to
the realm of speech, and he risks punishment and prosecution. For instance, an Ohio man named Brian Dalton pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to seven years in prison in 2001 “for creating and possessing a personal
diary containing violent sexual fantasies involving children.”72 The decision,73 along with the statute on which it was based,74 was roundly criticized by many, including Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe,
who called it “as close as you can get to creating a thought crime.”75
Tribe’s comments would prove prophetic in March 2004 when Judge
David E. Cain held that Dalton, who had by that time spent eighteen
months in prison, was wrongly convicted and could not be tried again.76
Judge Cain opined that “[t]he defendant’s thoughts, no matter how hideous, were still just that – thoughts, the pathetic products of a sick imagination.”77 The judge added that while the State of Ohio was correctly concerned that Dalton, who had a previous conviction for possession of child
pornography when the diary was found, might re-offend, “the judicial
branch of government must resist the temptation to engage in pre-emptive
strikes.”78 Prosecutors had argued to Judge Cain at a previous hearing that
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); true threats, Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705, (1969) (per curiam); obscenity, Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 483-85 (1957); some forms of libel, Beauharnais v. Ill.,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); and fighting words, Chaplinsky v. N.H. 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942).
72. Matthew Sostrin, Private Writings and the First Amendment: The Case of Brian Dalton, 2003 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 887, 887 (2003).
73. See State v. Dalton, 793 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 2003) (describing the conviction of
Brian Dalton, but also determining that he was provided with such ineffective assistance of counsel
such that Dalton’s guilty plea should have been withdrawn).
74. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.321 (West 2003).
75. Sostrin, supra n. 72, at 888 (citing Kevin Peraino, A Seven-Year Sentence for a Diary, Newsweek 36 (July 30, 2001) (available at 2001 WL 19505065) (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe)).
76. Good Riddance; Judge Is Right to Halt Case of Man Tried for Deviant Thoughts, Columbus
Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio) 6A (Mar. 9, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, COLDIS file).
77. Id.
78. Kevin Mayhood, State Can’t Retry Author of Child Porn, Columbus Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio)
1A (Mar. 5, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, COLDIS file).
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Dalton was dangerous because he “literally mulls over the idea of sex with
children when he sees them on the street.”79
Just four months after Judge Cain’s well-reasoned March 2004 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an
opinion in July 2004 allowing Lafayette, Indiana to make such a preemptive strike against a man known as John Doe. Doe, like Dalton, mulled
the idea of having sex with children when he saw them. While Dalton
once may have been, as his attorney put it, “the only person in America
serving time for writing down his thoughts in a personal diary,”80 today
John Doe is the only man in America banned from public parks simply
because of his thoughts. Thoughts that, unlike Dalton, he never even wrote
down.
How can it be, then, that a federal appellate court, one including
prominent jurists such as Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, allowed a
man’s freedom of movement to be restricted because of his deviant
thoughts? As this Part makes clear, the answer is his freedom of movement hinged on his freedom of thought.
A. “If You Can Take a Man’s Life for the Thoughts That’s in His Head”81
Banning a man from a public park for his thoughts is a far cry from
taking away his life, but the principles of freedom of thought suggest that
neither punishment is warranted. Yet, it was the former prohibition that
divided the members of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in July 2004
in Doe v. City of Lafayette. While the judges on the Seventh Circuit ultimately parted ways on the outcome of the case, there certainly was at least
one matter on which they all agreed. The man known as John Doe, who is
now in his late 40s,82 is anything but a model citizen, regardless of his
“above-average intelligence and the bachelor’s degree in management he
earned from Purdue University in the late 1970s.”83 As Judge Williams
79. Jeb Phillips, Sex-Diary Writer Expected to Leave Jail, Columbus Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio)
12B (Sept. 16, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library, COLDIS file).
80. Tim Doulin, Diary Writer Seeks Dismissal of '01 Conviction; Lawyers Say Obscenity Plea
Flawed, Columbus Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio) 6C (Apr. 9, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library,
COLDIS file).
81. Bruce Springsteen, Johnny 99, in Nebraska (Columbia Records 1982) (CD) (singing from the
perspective of a man just sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison “if you can take a man’s life for the
thoughts that’s in his head [t]hen won’t you sit back in that chair and think it over judge one more time
[a]nd let ‘em shave off my hair and put me on that execution line”).
82. See Joe Gerrety, Park Ban Sparks Lawsuit, Debate Over Sex Offenders, J. & Courier (Lafayette,
Ind.) 18A (Apr. 4, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, JNLCOU file) (describing Doe as “now in
his late 40s”).
83. Joe Gerrety, ‘Paying for Being Honest,’ J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 8A (Apr. 4, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, JNLCOU file).
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wrote for the dissent, Doe’s “criminal history includes convictions for
child molestation, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and window peeping,” and he
“has been hospitalized, imprisoned, under house arrest, and on probation.”84 The dissent, which ruled in favor of Doe’s right to freedom of
thought, even called the content of those thoughts “repugnant and deplorable.”85 Doe, in common parlance, would probably be considered a pervert. As Judge Ripple wrote for the majority, Doe once “went into a locker
room at a local school, pulled down the swimsuit of a ten-year-old boy and
performed oral sex on him. The next year, Mr. Doe forcibly performed
oral sex on a twelve-year-old boy.”86
In January 2000, when the incident that gave rise to the dispute in City
of Lafayette occurred however, it had been nine years since Doe’s last conviction87 and he was not on probation at the time.88 Ultimately, what occurred on a Saturday evening in early January 2000 in a park in Lafayette,
Indiana would send Doe’s life back into darkness. Perhaps more importantly, it would also give rise to a set of facts that tests just how far the
judiciary is willing to stretch and extend the unenumerated constitutional
right of freedom of thought when the thoughts in question relate to committing one of the most heinous of crimes – child molestation.
Doe’s own words, taken under oath in a deposition, describing the
events (and thoughts) of that night are both clear and chilling. Doe was “in
the mood of cruising” and went looking “mostly” for children in Murdock
Park,89 a 39-acre park, featuring “[p]laygrounds, disc golf course, sled run,
basketball court, lighted softball field, 0.9 mile interpretive trail, picnic
areas and grills.”90
For the attorney defending the City of Lafayette in the lawsuit that Doe
would later file against it in November 2000, it allegedly was the conduct
by Doe of driving to a park with playgrounds and a ball field, and looking
for children, rather than any thoughts that caused him to be banned from
city parks. As attorney Jerry Withered told the members of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in January 2004 during oral argument for the city,
“Mr. Doe was not banned from the Lafayette city parks for what he
thought. He was banned for what he did. He’s in the park, and before he
84. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting).
85. Id. at 784.
86. Id. at 758 (majority).
87. Id. at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting) (writing that Doe’s “last conviction was
in 1991, ten years before this litigation”).
88. Id. at 774, n. 4 (“Doe was not on probation in January 2000 and was not even restricted from
entering the park during his period of house arrest a decade earlier.”).
89. Id. at 759 (majority).
90. See Lafayette-West Lafayette Convention & Visitors Bureau, Recreation, http://www.lafayette
-in.com/recreation.html (accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
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got to the park, he’s cruising around looking for children.”91 Doe’s attorney countered that “[t]he city is saying because of what is in your mind,
and the fact that it is in your mind while you are near children, we can ban
you.”92
What precisely was John Doe thinking about in the park? When asked
that question during a deposition in the case, Doe stated the following:
When I saw the three, the four kids there, my thoughts were
thoughts I had before when I see children, possibly expose myself
to them, I thought about the possibility of, you know, having some
kind of sexual contact with the kids, but I know with four kids
there, that’s pretty difficult to do. It’s a wide open area. Those
thoughts were there, but they, you know, weren’t realistic at the
time. They were just thoughts.93
He watched the children for 15-30 minutes, and without having any
contact with them, left the park.94 Doe also stated in the deposition that he
said “to [him]self: I’ve got to get out of here before I do something, so I
left.”95 He added in an affidavit, “I was not planning to act on my
thoughts. I recognized that these were just unhealthy thoughts and I realized I needed to leave the park, which is what I did.”96 Doe did in fact
leave peacefully and the city “did not receive any complaints from the
children in the park.”97
At this stage, no one else knew what Doe had been thinking while he
was watching the children play in Murdock Park. But this would soon
change when he transformed his thoughts into speech. Shortly after leaving the park, Doe paged his psychologist and “explained what occurred and
expressed that he was upset about the incident. As part of his treatment,
his psychologist suggested that he discuss the incident with his Sexual Addicts Anonymous (SAA) group, which was to meet a few days later.”98
The sad irony is that his remarks to the group about his thoughts would not
remain anonymous. Indeed, Doe recently told a reporter for the local paper
in Lafayette, Indiana, that he “suspects that someone in the group tipped
his former probation officer, which led to officials banning him from the

91. Joe Gerrety, Parks Ban Arguments Heard, J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 16A (Jan. 10, 2004)
(available at LEXIS, News library, JNLCOU file).
92. Id.
93. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 760 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 774, n 2.
97. Id. at 779.
98. Id. at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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parks.”99 Thus, Doe was punished for trying to do the right thing – seeking
help at a group therapy session. As Doe himself noted in a 2004 interview,
“I did the right thing by leaving [the park]. I did the right thing by calling
my therapist that night. I did the right thing by telling my group the next
night. I’ve been paying for that for the past four years – paying for being
honest.”100 Judge Williams translated this paradox into legal terms, writing
for the dissent that “[t]he First Amendment’s concern with freedom of
thought as a basis for the freedom of expression is highlighted by the facts
of this case. The chilling effect of this ruling, i.e., that the communication
of one’s thoughts may result in being banned from public spaces, is frightening.”101
In early February of 2000, Doe received letters from Lafayette, Indiana
officials notifying him that he was banned both from all of the city’s parks
and from all of the city’s school grounds.102 Doe did not contest the school
ban but he objected to the park prohibition because he wanted to go there
to play softball, watch little league games, and walk with friends.103 He
filed a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Lafayette in November
2000104 contending, among other things, that the city was “punishing him
for his private thoughts.”105
B. Thoughts, Actions, and the Notion of Psychiatric Brinkmanship
The key to understanding why the majority ruled in favor of the City of
Lafayette while the dissent ruled against it is found in one critical difference in their interpretation and understanding of the facts. That difference
pivots on a fundamental dichotomy between thought and action. Simply
put, the majority believed John Doe was banned from parks because of his
actions and conduct – not because of his thoughts and fantasies – on that
day in January 2000.106 As Judge Ripple wrote for the majority:
The City has not banned him from having sexual fantasies about
children. It did not ban him from the public parks because he admitted to having sexual fantasies about children in his home or
even in a coffee shop. The inescapable reality is that Mr. Doe did
not simply entertain thoughts; he brought himself to the brink of
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Joe Gerrety, Paying for Being Honest, J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 8A (Apr. 4, 2004).
Id.
City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 784 (Williams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 760 (majority).
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 766-67.
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committing child molestation. He had sexual urges directed toward children, and he took dangerous steps toward gratifying his
urges by going to a place where he was likely to find children in a
vulnerable situation.107
By focusing on Doe’s “conduct in going to the park in search of children to satisfy his deviant desires,”108 the majority was able to give short
shrift to the First Amendment concerns of freedom of thought. The majority opined that “[t]he First Amendment’s freedom of mind principle does
not subject every conduct-focused regulation to First Amendment scrutiny;
rather, it only prohibits those regulations aimed at pure thought and thus
mind control.”109 For the majority, it was the act of intentionally driving to
the park to look for children–conduct the majority described as “psychiatric brinkmanship”110–that moved the case out of the realm of pure thought
and into the arena of conduct.
Such judicial sleight of hand and fixation on conduct is not unusual
among jurists in First Amendment cases when the speech in question is
repugnant or deeply offensive. For instance, the United States Supreme
Court faced the issue in 1971 of whether the First Amendment protected a
man’s right to wear, in a Los Angeles courthouse, a jacket emblazoned
with the words “Fuck the Draft.”111 While the majority of the Court ruled
in favor of Paul Robert Cohen and found that his case was about the First
Amendment right of free speech,112 the dissent held that the case involved
“mainly conduct and little speech.”113 The dissent thus wrote in Cohen that
“agonizing over First Amendment values seems misplaced and unnecessary.”114 Importantly, the logic that the case was about conduct rather than
speech allowed Justice Hugo Black, a free speech absolutist,115 to side with
the minority and not protect Cohen’s jacket.116

107. Id.
108. Id. at 764.
109. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 762.
111. Cohen v. Cal, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
112. Id. at 18 (writing that Cohen’s “conviction quite clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of
the words Cohen used to convey his message to the public. The only ‘conduct’ which the State sought
to punish is the fact of communication. Thus, we deal here with a conviction resting solely upon
‘speech.’ ”).
113. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. See generally Don R. Pember & Clay Calvert, Mass Media Law 43 (14th ed., McGraw Hill
2005) (describing the absolutist theory of free speech in which “[t]he government cannot censor the
press for any reason. There are no exceptions.”).
116. See John Zelezny, Communications Law: Liberties, Restraints, and the Modern Media 59 (4th
ed., Wadsworth 2003) (writing that Justice Hugo Black “argued for some form of absolutist approach
to interpretation of the First Amendment,” but noting that “Black interpreted his absolutism narrowly,
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The justices in Cohen thus divided themselves along the lines of a
speech-versus-conduct dichotomy. Similarly, the judges in City of Lafayette divided themselves along a thought-versus-conduct dichotomy. While
the majority of the Seventh Circuit found the ban of John Doe to be based
on conduct, the three dissenting judges squarely disagreed. Judge Williams wrote for the dissent that it was “clear on this record, that absent
Doe’s thoughts . . . the City would be uninterested in Doe’s decision to go
to the park that fateful day.”117 This had to have been the case because, as
Williams added, “the City acknowledges that Doe’s own revelation of his
thoughts, not any outward expression demonstrating his thinking, is the
basis for its actions.”118
Judge Williams concluded that “going to the park does not rise to the
level of an ‘action’ of sufficient gravity to justify punishment.”119 He reasoned, by way of example:
In the same way that the individual with a history of robbing banks
could not be charged with attempted bank robbery for standing
across the street from the bank and thinking about robbing it, Doe
may not be punished for merely thinking perverted thoughts about
children.120
Adding another example to illustrate her point, Judge Williams wrote
that “punishing a drug addict who stands outside a dealer’s house craving a
hit but successfully resists the urge to enter and purchase drugs would be
offensive to our understanding of the bounds of the criminal law.”121
Because the majority and dissent disagreed on whether the case pivoted on John Doe’s conduct or John Doe’s thoughts, both sides framed the
issues and interests at stake in different fashions. The majority framed the
case as one about protecting children from the conduct of a convicted pedophile, playing up Doe’s status as a sex offender122 while, conversely,

arguing that, because speech and press freedoms were mentioned explicitly, only those strict forms of
expression were protected”).
117. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 778.
118. Id. at 776 (Williams, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 783.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 767 (majority) (The majority wrote, for instance, that “Mr. Doe is an admitted sexual
addict with a proclivity toward children; as such, he belongs to a group of persons who are more susceptible to having sexual desires with respect to children and to acting on those urges. We cannot
ignore, nor can we say the law somehow commands the City to ignore, Mr. Doe’s pedophilia and the
history of his battle with that affliction. Facing this reality certainly does not license society, acting
through government, to exile, harass or marginalize Mr. Doe, but it permits government to fulfill its
responsibility to protect vulnerable children in dangerous situations.”) (emphasis in original).
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eliminating from that framing any constitutional concerns about the freedom of thought and First Amendment scrutiny.123 As the majority wrote:
The First Amendment does not prohibit the City from taking the
action it did to protect its children. It does not require the City to
act in an ostrichlike fashion and expose the children of the City to
the risk that, on a future date, a child will wander further from the
group, present a better opportunity and experience the tragic consequences.124
The majority posed twin hypothetical, what-if questions that focused
on the danger to children, not the danger to constitutional rights. The majority asked, “[w]hat if there were only one child there that evening?
Would Mr. Doe have succumbed to his urges and considered the opportunity more ‘realistic’?”125 It is somewhat striking and disturbing that a federal appellate court would seem to be justifying its decision, at least in
some small part, on a set of hypothetical questions and fact patterns not
before it, guessing what may or may not have happened. It was as if the
majority was acting more like a law professor tweaking a hypothetical in
front of a class than like a court bound by the facts before it.
Yet the majority tipped its hand, revealing that the case was not about
any conduct that actually occurred, when it wrote that “Mr. Doe brought
himself to the brink.”126 That statement begs the question: The brink of
what? The answer is obvious – the brink of criminal conduct. And the fact
is that Doe never engaged in criminal conduct; he never traversed and
crossed the chasm that divided thought from action while in Murdock Park
that night in January 2000.
In contrast to the majority’s conduct-centric framing of the issues, the
dissent wrote that the case raised a trio of freedom-of-thought based questions:
May a city constitutionally ban one of its citizens from public
property based on its discovery of that individual’s immoral
thoughts? Is being banned from public property a ‘punishment’?
Does the First Amendment protect a citizen’s right to think about

123. The First Amendment issue of freedom of thought was eliminated, for the majority, because of
its claim that First Amendment scrutiny was only applicable to “pure thought” cases. See supra nn.
109-10 and accompanying text.
124. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767.
125. Id. at 762.
126. Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
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committing a crime, even if he has committed that crime in the
past?127
The answers to these questions for the dissent were, in the order asked
above: no, yes, and yes. More simply put, the dissenting judges concluded
that “the City of Lafayette may not punish Doe for his thinking alone, for
without protection from government intrusion into our thoughts, the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment are virtually meaningless.”128
C. Four First Amendment-Based Reasons Why the Majority Got it Wrong
The freedoms of thought and speech are inextricably linked. John Stuart Mill wrote, nearly 150 years ago in On Liberty about “the liberty of
thought, from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of
speaking and of writing.”129 Far more recently, Rodney Smolla wrote that,
“[t]he linkage of speech to thought, to man’s central capacity to reason and
wonder, is what places speech above other forms of fulfillment, and beyond the routine jurisdiction of the state.”130 But one does not need the
words of a law school dean or prominent First Amendment scholar to appreciate this fact. The well-worn cliché “think before you speak”131 tells us
that much. Ironically, of course, John Doe did think before he spoke – he
just never should have spoken up about his thoughts. John Doe’s case
aside, it is clear that thought should be a prerequisite for expression.
Given this close connection between thought and speech, as well as the
fact that the freedom of each is covered by the same constitutional amendment, it is reasonable to attempt to understand, using principles derived
from free expression jurisprudence, why the majority of the Seventh Circuit erred in ruling against John Doe on the issue of freedom of thought.
The reasons set forth below are either in addition to or significantly expand
upon those of the dissent in Doe v. City of Lafayette. They provide, then, a
different rationale for understanding the flaws with the majority’s logic and
conclusion.

127. Id. at 776 (Williams, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 785.
129. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 18 (Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (originally
published 1859).
130. Smolla, supra n. 41, at 10.
131. The phrase is usually used when a person says something stupid that gets that person into trouble. See Phyllis Stark et al., Disco, Davidians, and Diatribes: The Dubious Distinction Awards, Billboard 97 (Dec. 25, 1993) (giving out a “Think Before You Speak Award” to a program director at a
rock music radio station who “practically fired himself” at a National Association of Broadcasters
meeting when he said, “There has to be that one guy at your station who lives and breathes the music.
Now I’m not that guy, and if that guy isn’t your program director, you should fire him.”).
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1. The Seventh Circuit’s Flawed New Doctrine of “Pure Thought”
In holding that John Doe’s case was not subject to First Amendment
scrutiny, the majority of the Seventh Circuit wrote that “[t]he First
Amendment’s freedom of mind principle does not subject every conductfocused regulation to First Amendment scrutiny; rather, it only prohibits
those regulations aimed at pure thought and thus mind control.”132 For the
majority, “a government entity no doubt runs afoul of the First Amendment
when it punishes an individual for pure thought.”133 Why restrict First
Amendment protection of the right to think to pure thoughts only, rather
than applying it to situations in which there is a combination or hybrid of
thought and action? The majority simply reasoned that “[l]imiting First
Amendment protection to pure thought is rooted in common sense.”134
In fact, while the majority relies heavily on the doctrine of “pure
thought”–it uses that phrase, moreover, six different times across a span of
only three pages135–it is a brand-new doctrine, its own invention that is not
grounded on precedent. An online, keyword search of all United States
Supreme Court opinions for all dates reveals that there is not a single case
that includes the phrase “pure thought.”136 There are, then, no Supreme
Court opinions containing both “pure thought” and “First Amendment.”
At the federal appellate court level, there are only four opinions (other than
the initial137 and en banc138 rulings in Doe v. City of Lafayette) ever written
that include the phrase “pure thought.”139 None of those opinions were
from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.140
132. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 765 (emphasis added).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 765-67.
136. To conduct this research, the author of this article, on September 17, 2004, used the “Legal
Research” section of the LexisNexis® Academic online database, searching under “Federal Case Law”
for “Supreme Court Cases” for all available dates. The “keyword” search was for the phrase “pure
thought.” The online database is available to subscribers at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/form
/academic/legalresearch.html (last visited for purposes of this specific search on Apr. 23, 2005).
137. Doe, 334 F.3d 606, vacated and reh’g granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16563 (7th Cir. Aug. 8,
2003).
138. 377 F.3d 757.
139. See U.S. v. Ragsdale, 438 F.2d 21, 26 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971) (using
the phrase “pure thoughts” only one time in the context of the sentence “[n]oble motives and pure
thoughts cannot bar the conviction of one who admits intentional action which violates the proscriptions of a statute declaring that action criminal, and a judge can properly instruct as to what acts the
statute condemns, which is the most the instructions did here”); U.S. v. Howard, 504 F.2d 1281, 1284
(8th Cir. 1974) (using the phrase “pure thoughts” only one time and quoting it in the context from
another case, “Noble motives and pure thoughts cannot bar the conviction of one who admits intentional action which violates the proscriptions of a statute declaring that action criminal”) (citing
Ragsdale, 438 F.2d at 26); Winter v. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (using
the phrase “pure thought” only one time, in context of a case in which an individual sued the publisher
of a book on mushrooms, in support of the proposition that a “’How to Use’ book is pure thought and
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In fact, the Seventh Circuit’s pure thought doctrine–a doctrine under
which no First Amendment scrutiny is applied in a case if there is any
combination or mixture of thoughts with conduct–directly conflicts with
fundamental principles of First Amendment free expression jurisprudence.
In particular, the United States Supreme Court has recognized and clearly
established that when speech and conduct are combined, First Amendment
scrutiny does apply. Thus the conduct of flag burning may involve and
combine with such expressive elements that it is said to constitute speech
protected by the First Amendment.141 Under the Court’s symbolic speech
doctrine “conduct is analyzed as speech under the First Amendment if,
first, there is the intent to convey a specific message and, there is a substantial likelihood that the message would be understood by those receiving it.”142
If conduct can mix with expressive elements and be subjected to First
Amendment scrutiny, then why shouldn’t conduct be able to mix with elements of thought and imagination and also be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny? Neither the majority nor the dissent addressed the symbolic
speech doctrine or this paradox.
Furthermore, it is clear that the thoughts involved in Doe v. City of Lafayette are not merely de minimis, incidental, or tangential to conduct. It
was the thoughts of John Doe that initially caused him to drive to Murdock
Park and, once there, it was only his thoughts, when later translated to
speech at a therapy session, that landed Doe in trouble, as he engaged in no
conduct while at the park (unless the majority considered sitting conduct,
something which even it did not have the moxie to assert). Anyone can
drive to a park and sit on a bench in Forrest Gump-like fashion.143 What
made Doe different from some latter-day Gump was the perverted thoughts
that ran through his head.144

expression”); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (using the phrase “pure thought” only
one time in the context of a case involving a former Navy midshipman who admitted to being a homosexual constitutionality of the regulations pursuant to which he was discharged from the Naval Academy).
140. See supra n. 139 (identifying the appellate courts in question that have used the phrase “pure
thought”).
141. See Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the conviction, under a Texas law, of
Gregory Lee Johnson for publicly burning an American flag in 1984 near the Republican National
Convention as a sign of political protest violated his First Amendment right of free speech).
142. Chemerinsky, supra n. 48, at 1027.
143. See Eleanor Ringel, Movies; Review; “Mamma Roma,” Atlanta J. & Const. 8P (May 19, 1995)
(describing “Forrest Gump on his park bench”).
144. While the fictional Gump benignly pondered his box of chocolates, Doe deviously pondered
pedophilic desires. See Maria Laurino, A New Breed of Hero, Houston Chron. 10 (July 4, 1994) (describing how the character Forrest Gump “sits squarely on a park bench in a starched cream suit, his
shirt buttoned to the collar, holding a box of chocolates”).
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In a weak attempt to support its newly minted pure thought doctrine,
the majority in City of Lafayette cited the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in the child pornography possession case of Osborne v. Ohio.145
The majority of the Seventh Circuit wrote:
In rejecting Osborne’s First Amendment arguments, the Court distinguished its freedom of thought precedent: The difference here is
obvious: The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted § 2907.323(A)(3)
in order to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children.146
The difference between the two cases is clear; real children are harmed
when child pornography is created. No real children, however, were
harmed by John Doe in Murdock Park in January of 2000. Osborne’s consideration of freedom of thought thus is readily distinguished from the issue and facts in City of Lafayette.
2. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination on Thought and Expression
Justice William Brennan, a staunch supporter of First Amendment
rights,147 once wrote that “viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its
purest form.”148 It is a point that courts have re-affirmed over the years.
For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
wrote in 2004 that the First Amendment provides a right “to be free of
viewpoint-based discrimination and punishment”149 and that “one of the
most egregious types of First Amendment violations is viewpoint-based
discrimination.”150 The government should remain neutral as to viewpoints
on particular issues when it regulates expression.151 The prohibition
against viewpoint-based regulations represents “a fundamental First
Amendment principle – that government may not proscribe speech or expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed.”152 For
145. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
146. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 776 (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109).
147. See generally Robert D. Richards, Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide Open: Mr. Justice Brennan’s
Legacy to the First Amendment (Parkway Publishers 1994) (detailing Brennan’s contributions to free
speech jurisprudence).
148. Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004).
150. Id. at 1279.
151. See generally Esperanza Peace & Just. Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433, 444-45
(W.D. Tex. 2001) (discussing “[t]he prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, and the requirement
of its converse, viewpoint neutrality”).
152. Id. at 444.
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instance, the government could not permissibly regulate only pro-life
speech on the topic of abortion but allow pro-choice speech on the same
topic to go unfettered.
Academics concur with this assessment. For instance, former Stanford
Law School Dean Kathleen M. Sullivan and the late constitutional law
professor Gerald Gunther have written that “[t]he Court generally treats
restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm
violation of the First Amendment.”153
If viewpoint-based regulation of expression is prohibited, then, by implication and analogy in First Amendment jurisprudence, viewpoint-based
regulation of thought, the precursor to expression, must also be prohibited.
Yet the majority’s opinion in City of Lafayette represents the ultimate in
viewpoint-based discrimination. Why? Because, on the topic of children
and how one should think about them, Doe was punished precisely because
of his pedophilic viewpoint – precisely because he viewed, in his mind,
children as sex objects for his desire, gratification and satisfaction. In
comparison, had John Doe gone to Murdock Park and harbored what most
would consider to be positive, non-pedophilic thoughts about children, the
City of Lafayette would not have taken action against him and, furthermore, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals never would have heard of this
particular John Doe. For instance, if Doe had sat on a bench in the park
and thought to himself, “those children have so much energy and great
futures ahead of them. I wish them the best of luck in school and in their
rest of their lives,” then nothing would have happened to him. It was only
because of Doe’s deviant viewpoint on the topic of children that he was
banned from Lafayette’s parks.
As a general principle, then, the majority’s opinion in City of Lafayette
embodies and embraces viewpoint-based discrimination on a person’s
thoughts. For the appellate court, one may freely possess “good” thoughts
about a topic like children, but one cannot have “bad” thoughts about that
same subject matter. The decision thus flies in the face of established First
Amendment jurisprudence in the area of free speech and it begs for reversal by the United States Supreme Court.
3. Free Speech Theory Applied: The Marketplace of Ideas & SelfRealization
Two important and well-established theories about the importance of
free speech–the marketplace of ideas and self-realization/self-fulfillment–
support and provide rationales for John Doe’s right to freedom thought.
153. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, First Amendment Law 212 (2d ed., Found. Press 2003).
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Neither theory was mentioned by either the majority or the dissent in City
of Lafayette, but each provides an important justification for the protection
of Doe’s thoughts, given the proximity between thought and speech.
Those justifications are described below.
a. Marketplace of Ideas
The marketplace of ideas theory for protecting expression “represents
one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and
for laypersons,”154 and it “is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the
free speech tradition.”155 Professor Martin Redish observes that “over the
years, it has not been uncommon for scholars or jurists to analogize the
right of free expression to a marketplace in which contrasting ideas compete for acceptance among a consuming public.”156 The metaphor is used
frequently today.157 More than seventy-five years after it first became a
part of First Amendment jurisprudence with Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s often-quoted admonition that “the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”158 As Holmes’ quotation suggests, the theory embodies what
Professor Daniel Farber calls “the truth-seeking rationale for free expression.”159
The premises and goals of the marketplace of ideas theory of free
speech, when applied to freedom of thought, support John Doe’s case and
the need for reversal of the majority’s opinion. First, the theory is logically
borrowed from the realm of speech because “ideas” are, after all, thoughts;
one could easily substitute the phrase “marketplace of thoughts” for “marketplace of ideas.” It is only the use and engagement of speech that transforms private thoughts into a public marketplace of ideas in which one’s
thoughts–one’s ideas–compete against those of other individuals.
John Stuart Mill, the philosopher closely associated with the marketplace of ideas theory,160 recognized the importance of protecting thought,
observing that an individual is sovereign over his own mind.161 Mill wrote
154. Matthew D. Bunker, Critiquing Free Speech: First Amendment Theory and the Challenge of
Interdisciplinarity 2 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assocs. 2001).
155. Smolla, supra n. 41, at 6.
156. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1083 (1999).
157. See e.g. Va. v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (describing an “uninhibited marketplace of
ideas”).
158. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
159. Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 4 (2d ed. Found. Press 2003).
160. See Bunker, supra n. 154, at 3 (writing that “[m]arketplace theory grew in sophistication as a
result of British philosopher John Stuart Mill’s 1959 defense of free speech in ‘On Liberty’ ”).
161. Mill, supra n. 129, at 13.
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in On Liberty that the region of human liberty includes “the inward domain
of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling.”162 Ultimately, it was John
Doe’s conscience that moved him voluntarily to leave Murdock Park,
without harming anyone, and to seek help from his psychologist.
Second, “the core insight of marketplace theory–fallibilism–leads us to
exercise great caution before silencing viewpoints with which we disagree.”163 Both the majority and dissent in City of Lafayette disagreed with
the viewpoint of John Doe on children, as would almost anyone, yet the
marketplace metaphor serves “as a stabilizing force against”164 the urge to
censor such viewpoints. Under the marketplace theory, Doe is allowed to
hold his viewpoint (in this case, it initially was an internal viewpoint that
was only later expressed at his therapy session) and the proper remedy for
it is counterspeech,165 not censorship. At the heart of the counterspeech
doctrine is the idea, as Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote, “[i]f there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”166
Doe, in fact, went to his group therapy session–a mini-marketplace of
ideas, as it were–to seek help and correction for his deviant ideas. The
speech of the other members of the group would serve as counterspeech.
But, ultimately, John Doe was punished for this action and for his speech,
if one believes his assertion that it probably was someone from that group
who told his former probation officer about his views about children while
in Murdock Park.167 Ironically, had Doe engaged in self-censorship–had
he chosen not to speak up in this marketplace of ideas and, instead, exercised his right not to speak–he would not have been punished. But selfcensorship and silence does not make “bad” thoughts go way; it only
drives them underground, as it were, where they may fester and breed larger problems later. Thus, the idea in First Amendment jurisprudence that
free speech serves as a “safety valve”168 preventing trouble is relevant here

162. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
163. Bunker, supra n. 154, at 8.
164. Id.
165. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old
Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 553 (2000) (analyzing the counterspeech doctrine and
providing some relatively recent examples of its application in free speech controversies).
166. Whitney v. Ca, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
167. Supra n. 99 and accompanying text.
168. Farber, supra n. 159, at 6.
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as well.169 Had Doe not expressed his feelings in an effort to cure his urges
and impulses, his problems might have built up.
The marketplace of ideas metaphor also supports Doe in another way.
In particular, it should be the worth of the idea–the quality of the thought–
that matters most in the competition of ideas, not the character of individual behind the idea. Put differently, it is the quality of the idea, not the
quality of the individual thinker behind it, that is pivotal. Justice Holmes
thus focused on “the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,”170 not the power or lack thereof of the individual
behind the thought.
It seems clear that John Doe’s thoughts, once expressed and discussed,
should not be “accepted” in the competition of the market but rather driven
out from it. However, the problem, from a marketplace of ideas perspective, is that the majority of the Seventh Circuit placed far too much emphasis on the quality of the man behind the thought. For instance, the majority
wrote:
We cannot ignore, nor can we say the law somehow commands the
City to ignore, Mr. Doe’s pedophilia and the history of his battle
with that affliction. Facing this reality certainly does not license
society, acting through government, to exile, harass or marginalize
Mr. Doe, but it permits government to fulfill its responsibility to
protect vulnerable children in dangerous situations.171
Dissenting Judge Williams recognized the majority’s over-emphasis, if
not reliance, in its reasoning on the character of the person behind the
thought. She wrote that the “only factors that differentiate Doe from others
are that the City was apprised of his thoughts while he was in the park and
its knowledge of his past conduct.”172 Doe’s First Amendment right of free
thought should not be reduced in importance because of what he has done
in the past. As Judge Williams wrote, it is an “axiomatic principle” that
punishment of a person for his or her status is “impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment.”173 And while the First Amendment rights of prisoners in jail are not coextensive with those of individuals on the other side of

169. See generally Kent R. Middleton et al., The Law of Public Communication, 30 (Allyn & Bacon
2004) (“Free expression can act as a safety valve, allowing critics to participate in change rather than
seek influence through antisocial acts.”).
170. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
171. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767.
172. Id. at 779 (Williams, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 782. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
U.S. Const. amend VIII.
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the bars,174 Doe was no longer in prison or on probation. He was a free
man who had served his time.
b. Self-Realization/Self-Fulfillment
A second rationale or theory for protection of free speech is selfrealization and self-fulfillment of the individual, regardless of whether
some larger truth is discovered in the marketplace of ideas. In this theory,
free speech is privileged as “an end in itself, an end intimately entwined
with human autonomy and dignity.”175 As Smolla writes, the “freedom to
speak without restraint provides the speaker with an inner satisfaction and
realization of self-identity essential to individual fulfillment.”176 Bunker
notes that under this theory, which he dubs individual autonomy,
“[f]reedom of speech contributes to individuals’ opportunities to develop
their rational faculties and to make critical decisions about the pursuit of a
good life.”177
The last line above is italicized for a particular reason. Why? Because
it was through the freedom of thought, that John Doe made critical decisions about the pursuit of a good life. In the internal struggle in his own
mind that went on that January day in 2000 in Murdock Park, Doe made
the right decision – he decided to leave and to call his psychologist. He
decided that his own identity would not–at least not on that occasion–be
that of a child molester, but rather one of a person seeking to gain control
over his own life through his thoughts, his speech and, subsequently, his
behavior.
If the theory of self-realization is tied to human dignity and autonomy
interests,178 then Doe should be rewarded, not punished because his
autonomous decision-making process ultimately resulted in Doe keeping
his behavioral impulses in check. It violates the principle of human dignity
to punish Doe when, ultimately, he made the dignified decision to leave
and to seek further treatment. Significantly, in an interview in 2004 with a
reporter from a local newspaper, Doe pondered why he went to the park in
the first place, stating “[t]he only thing I can come up with was that it was
174. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (adopting a lesser standard of scrutiny to apply to
restrictions on the speech rights prisoners; writing that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”; and reasoning that “[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration”).
175. Smolla, supra n. 41, at 9.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Bunker, supra n. 154, at 12 (emphasis added).
178. Bellah, supra n. 43 and accompanying text.
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maybe a test. Just to see if, being ‘free,’ if I’d continue to act the way I
had under probation and house arrest.”179 Doe thinks that he passed that
mental test,180 and his psychologist “focused on the fact that Doe was able
to control his urge and leave the park as a positive step in his rehabilitation.”181
Doe was able, then, in this private mind game to take a metaphorical
mental eraser, as it were, to his deviant thoughts and to keep them in check
with different thoughts – thoughts about the better person that he longed
and desired to be. That, after all, surely explains why he immediately
called his psychologist after leaving the park to tell her about what had just
taken place. As Doe stated during a deposition in the case, “I recognized
that these were just unhealthy thoughts and I realized I needed to leave the
park, which is what I did.”182 In brief, the First Amendment theory of selfrealization through speech, when extended to apply to self-realization
through thought–thought being the requisite precursor to speech–militates
in favor protecting John Doe and reversing his ban from Lafayette’s public
parks.
4. Offensive Ideas, Not Just Offensive Images
Judge Williams’ dissent does an excellent job in emphasizing the Supreme Court’s recognition in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,183 described above in Part I, that fake images of minors engaged in sexual conduct cannot be banned simply because of the mental gymnastics and
thought processes of pedophiles that transform them into sexual stimuli
that may lead to deviant conduct. She writes that the Court held that “the
fact that possession of virtual child pornography may ignite sexually immoral thoughts about children was not enough to justify banning it.”184
Likewise, she notes the Court’s rejection in Free Speech Coalition of the
federal government’s argument that the images can be banned because
those thought processes may lead to criminal conduct.185 As Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority of the high court:
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Gerrety, supra n. 83.
Id.
City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 774.
535 U.S. 234.
City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 777 (Williams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 778-79.
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speech must be protected from the government because speech is
the beginning of thought.186
While Judge Williams correctly focuses on this language and Free
Speech Coalition’s protection of offensive imagery of computer-generated
children, it is important to point out another area left unaddressed by the
dissent involving offensive expression that also supports Doe’s case. In
particular, Free Speech Coalition dealt with offensive images and how
those images were mentally mapped in minds of pedophiles. But Doe’s
case does not revolve around offensive images that he examined; rather, it
pivots on the offensive ideas in his head about allegedly procuring and
plotting to seduce children in a park. As Doe admitted:
[M]y thoughts were . . . [to] possibly expose myself to them . . .
[and] having some kind of sexual contact with the kids, but I know
with four kids there, that’s pretty difficult to do. It’s a wide open
area. Those thoughts . . . weren’t realistic at the time.187
The case thus centers as much on offensive ideas of seduction of children as it does about fantasized offensive images of actual molestation.
The case must be made, then, that offensive ideas–not just offensive images–are protected by the freedom of thought.
To this extent, it is somewhat surprising that the dissent in City of Lafayette failed to seize upon the United States Supreme Court’s supportive
language in Texas v. Johnson.188 In particular, Justice William J. Brennan
wrote that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”189 If
the expression of an offensive idea is protected by the First Amendment,
then surely the idea itself must also be protected, regardless of whether it
ever is transformed into written, spoken or symbolic expression. Thus,
while Doe’s thoughts clearly were offensive, they nonetheless would be
protected under the precedent of Texas v. Johnson extended into the realm
of thought.
Doe’s thoughts and fantasies in the park dealt with a sexual taboo – sex
between adults and children. Interestingly, the United States Supreme
Court has protected offensive imaginative expression relating to a similar
sexual taboo – incest. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,190 the Court held
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253.
City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 760.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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that the First Amendment protected a sexual explicit magazine’s imaginative message that a well-respected religious figure engaged in “a drunken
incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.”191 The Court, in
support of its decision, cited an earlier opinion for the following proposition:
The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that
gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment
that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas.192
This language thus bridges principles of protection for offensive
speech with the theory of the marketplace of ideas described earlier.193 If
offensive expression is protected, then surely offensive thought is protected. After all, absent some kind of thought police that are able to get
inside our heads to read our minds, offensive thought must manifest itself
in the form of speech in order for it to be known. No one would have
known the offensive thoughts of John Doe in Murdock Park had he not
transformed those thoughts into speech conveyed to his psychologist and
therapy group.
In summary, there are multiple reasons why, from a First Amendment
perspective, John Doe’s thoughts, however offensive or deviant they might
have been, deserve protection against government action and retribution.
The next part of this article examines the possible ramifications of the majority’s holding in City of Lafayette should other courts adopt its analysis in
future cases.
IV. CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITIES: THE THOUGHT BUBBLES ABOVE
OUR HEADS
In an August 2004 editorial that generally lauded the majority opinion
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Lafayette, the staff of the
Lafayette Journal & Courier nonetheless posed an interesting and cautionary question to its readers: “[i]f thoughts were visible, as balloons hovering
over the heads of cartoon characters, imagine the graphic stories being told
through the park, through the mall or through any public area. How many

191. Id. at 48.
192. Id. at 55-56 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. 726, 745-46 (1978)).
193. Supra nn. 153-74 and accompanying text.
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more would be booted from city parks as a precaution?”194 The newspaper’s answer to its own query–“[m]ore than we might think, unfortunately”195–reveals the fundamental trouble with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.
In particular, who among us has not, at some point, harbored a thought
about committing crime and then, like John Doe, thought twice and not
acted it out? As a divorced colleague of the author at The Pennsylvania
State University half-jokingly remarked when told about the majority opinion in City of Lafayette, “I suspect there’d be an awful lot of ex-spouses
out there doing hard time.”
The hypotheticals at the start of this article help to illustrate other problems with both the feasibility and workability of the Seventh Circuit’s approach in City of Lafayette as applied to other situations. In particular,
they highlight three key factors or variables in the appellate court’s decision-making process that remain vague and undefined in their future applications. Those variables are:
• Distance: How close must one be, in terms of physical distance and
proximity, from the object(s) or target(s) of the criminal activity about
which one thinks before one can be punished for the thoughts?
• Conduct: How much conduct on the part of the thinker, as it were, is
necessary under the Seventh Circuit’s new pure-thought doctrine196 before
one is stripped of any First Amendment protection for freedom of thought?
• Prior Conduct: How much emphasis is placed on the past bad acts–
the prior criminal conduct–of the thinker in determining whether thoughts
may be punished or accounted for by governmental entities when it comes
to banning or prohibiting individuals from entering specific locations?
With regard to the issue of physical distance and proximity, it was important for the Seventh Circuit that John Doe drove to a park where he had
ready and easy access to the targets, in this case children, of his deviant
thoughts. How would this be applied to the first hypothetical in which a
man who harbors the thought of assassinating the President of the United
States is close enough to see George W. Bush as he steps out of his car
near Madison Square Garden? How would it apply to the high school student in the second hypothetical who fantasizes about killing his classmates
while he plays a video game in an arcade located just one block from his
school? Would it matter how long that block is?

194. A Victory for Parents, Parks in ‘John Doe’ Case, J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 5A (Aug. 2,
2004).
195. Id.
196. See supra nn. 132-40 and accompanying text (describing the pure thought doctrine created by
the majority in City of Lafayette).
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As to the second variable–conduct–precisely how many steps and actions are necessary on the part of the thinker before the notion of freedom
of thought is left by the wayside under the appellate court’s new-fangled
pure thought doctrine? For the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, it was
John Doe’s conduct of driving a car to a location where children were present that was sufficient to allow the majority not to apply First Amendment
scrutiny. Is there sufficient conduct in the first scenario on the part of the
actor to similarly lead a court to conclude that First Amendment scrutiny is
irrelevant? Is the act of attendance at an angry and heated political rally
such sufficient conduct? Is the mere act of standing enough conduct to
waive, as it were, First Amendment protection for freedom of thought?
What about the high school boy in the second scenario? Is the act of playing a video game–something that some people believe causes violence and
aggression among teens–sufficient action to eliminate First Amendment
protection for the violent fantasies in his head? Or is the act of walking to
the video arcade, much like Doe drove to a park, sufficient conduct to
scrap protection of thought? What if the student had walked to the school
grounds immediately after playing the video game, while he was still having fantasies about shooting his classmates?
Finally, as to the third variable–prior bad acts on the part of thinker–
how much weight does one give in the first scenario to the fact that the
individual at the anti-Bush rally recently completed a prison term for the
crime of assault with a deadly weapon? As noted earlier, the majority of
the Seventh Circuit emphasized in its reasoning John Doe’s long criminal
record of sexual deviance. How extensive, then, must one’s record be before a city or municipality is justified in banning an individual from a political rally in a park? How recent must the last prior conviction have been
in time to the bad thoughts which trigger action against him? What if a
person has no prior convictions or has never before engaged in the criminal
activity about which he thinks but then, later, mentally recants? Would it
make a difference in the second scenario if a fact was added that the high
school student once was arrested and convicted for animal cruelty for
shooting his neighbors’ cats?
These questions are left unanswered here precisely because the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is such that it leaves plenty of wiggle room and
legal leeway for possibility and speculation. The case of John Doe clearly
tests our limits on the freedom of thought because it deals with taboos–sex
between adults and children–that are among the most reprehensible and
reviled of crimes in the United States. But the assassination of a president
is similarly tragic and reviled, as are school shootings in which innocent
young lives are lost because of seemingly senseless violence. Would they
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be treated similarly? Only time and future cases will provide the answers
to this and the other questions raised above.
V. CONCLUSION
The seventeenth-century French philosopher Rene Descartes famously
proclaimed “cogito ergo sum,” which translates to English as “I think,
therefore I am.”197 After the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Doe v. City of
Lafayette, it seems like it is not too much of a stretch to rephrase that quotation to read, “I think criminal thoughts, therefore I am a criminal.”
Although John Doe had a criminal record, he was free when he harbored his criminal thoughts. It was a violation of his First Amendment
right to freedom of thought to ban him, because of his internal mind games
and deviant ideas, from Murdock Park and other venues in the City of Lafayette. This article has suggested multiple reasons, in both Parts II and
III, why the majority of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached the
wrong conclusion in its July 2004 decision. The reasons suggested here go
far beyond those identified by the three dissenting judges in the case. The
two fictitious scenarios set forth at the start of this article further help to
illustrate problems with the majority’s conclusion.
The philosopher Voltaire wrote that “the great consolation in life is to
say what one thinks.”198 For John Doe, however, it was the great scourge
of his life to say what he was thinking in a park one January day in 2000.
Had he concealed his thoughts, had he not sought treatment from his psychologist after he left the park, he never would have run afoul of the law,
and we would never know about John Doe’s case. Ultimately, then, Doe
was punished for sharing his thoughts with others. To not share one’s internal thoughts with others, no matter how bizarre or deviant they may be,
not only contradicts the two theories of freedom of expression described in
Part II, but it denies the very ability of one to be human through speech. It
is often said that hard cases make for bad law; in Doe’s case, it might be
more appropriate to say that bad thoughts made for bad law.
In summary, the Seventh Circuit majority’s logic and its reasoning in
City of Lafayette are both misguided and dangerous. Other courts must
reject it and, instead, preserve and strengthen the constitutional right to

197. See Descartes’ Epistemology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu
/entries/descartes-epistemology/#Cogito (accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
198. See QuoteWorld.Org, http://www.quoteworld.org/author.php?thetext=Francois+Marie+Arouet
+Voltaire+(1694-1778) (accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
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freedom of thought so recently trumpeted by the United States Supreme
Court.199

199. See supra nn. 46-56 and accompanying text (setting forth recent pronouncements by the United
States Supreme Court on freedom of thought).

